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THE SCOPE OF AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF UNDER TITLE
VII: UNITED STATES v. IRON WORKERS LOCAL 86
During the past sixty years organized labor has developed into
one of the most powerful political and economic groups in our society.
Their power has been utilized to produce many desirable advantages
for the workers including higher wages, shorter work weeks, medical
and dental plans, paid vacations, and retirement benefits. In order
to obtain these advantages, the unions have had to gain substantial
control over the skilled crafts and trades necessary for the maintenance
of America's industrial production. Once having acquired such con-
trol, it is only by restricting the number of skilled workers in the
crafts and by obtaining iron-clad collective bargaining agreements with
employers that the unions have been able to sustain the high wage
levels for their membership.:
Admittance to unions has been restricted primarily through ex-
clusionary devices such as strict limitations on the maximum size of
the union, nepotistic recruitment policies which heavily favor friends
and relatives of present union members, and membership qualification
criteria which tend to discriminate against minority groups. 2 Long ini-
1. See Comment, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Minority Group
Entry into the Building Trade Unions, 37 U. CH. L. Rav. 328 (1970).
2. In addition, there are other practices which act as barriers to minority group
entry into the building trades, e.g., lack of information about job opportunities and
fear of rejection by the unions. "Passive union recruitment policies usually result in
information about openings in the building trades reaching only the close friends or
relatives of present union members. Since few union members are members of
minority groups, little information about these [openings filters down into the black
community]." Id. at 331 & n.23. When such information does reach prospective
applicants they often fail to pursue the opportunity due to the union's reputation in the
black community for rejecting or discouraging majority applicants. Id. at 351. If,
despite the lack of information and the hostility toward minorities, a black does
apply, many of the criteria presently used for admission to the union and its programs
tend to discriminate against members of minority groups. For example, blacks who do
file applications may be overwhelmed by a multitude of forms or harassed by proc-
essing delays that allegedly result from misplaced or lost forms. Aptitude tests also
provide ample opportunity for discrimination, either in content, administration, or
grading. Equal treatment can also be denied through discriminatory initiation fees
and through internal rules that require nomination of an applicant by a member and
almost unanimous approval of the membership. Furthermore, since in most cases
preference is given to the relatives and friends of union members, the effect of prior
discrimination is perpetuated. Written and oral tests given to the applicant have
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tial training periods at relatively low wages, subjective standards for
admission, and a narrow age range for acceptable applicants further
discourage and sometimes even prevent admittance to union programs.3
Moreover, union bargaining agreements generally provide that the em-
ployer will rely on the union's hiring hail as his sole source of labor,
and also that referrals of employees by the union will be determined
according to priority based on previous work experience under a union
contract.4 Consequently, union members regularly receive preference
over nonunion members under the referral system, and only in periods
of relatively active employment are nonunion laborers given any work.5
proven fertile ground for discrimination by the unions. Such tests have generally been
entirely subjective and the grader has a great deal of personal discretion which is not
subject to review. Id. at 348-49. Also the journeyman's examination has often been
completely unrelated to the skills and knowledge necessary for job performance.
Another form of discrimination is practiced by restricting union membership size.
While it is true that these restrictions exclude whites as well as blacks, these policies
tend to perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination and thus have the practical
effect of excluding blacks from union membership. Id. at 356.
3. The normal period of indenture for an apprentice in the building trades
ranges from four to five years with the pay scale considerably below that of a journey-
man. In the past, the unions have required qualified nonunion blacks to go through the
long apprenticeship program at low pay despite the fact that the man possessed the
necessary skills to pass a fair journeyman's examination. Such practices reduce the
opportunities of blacks with some skills or experience to enter laterally from nonunion
work either as advanced trainees or journeymen. The objective requirements for
membership in the union, such as the possession of a high school diploma or the
passage of an intelligence test, are also less likely to be met by young blacks than by
young whites. The narrow age limits established for new members usually range in
the neighborhood of seventeen to twenty-three years which discourages the older, more
highly motivated blacks from entering the program. See Hain, Black Workers Versus
White Unions: Alternate Strategies in the Construction Industry, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 37
(1969).
4. Morse, The Scope of Judicial Relief Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 46 TEXAS L. RV. 516, 518 (1968).
5. The job referral practices followed by the unions typically rely on four
categories of priority. The highest priority category requires four years experience in
the trade, passage of a journeyman's examination, union membership, residence in the
jurisdiction of the local, and at least one year of experience under a union contract.
The next priority would be given to nonresident members of another local who have
passed a journeyman's examination and who have worked in the trade for four years.
The third priority is given to those with three years experience in the trade, six
months of which was obtained while working under a union contract, and residence in
the jurisdiction of the local. The largest number of nonmember workers seeking
referral through the hiring hall are in this third priority category. The lowest pri-
ority group is for those who have merely worked in the trade for at least one year.
Blacks, having been discriminated against in the past under the referral system, tend
to remain in this lowest priority group which tends to discourage them from relying
on the hiring hall for a job and forces them to seek employment as a nonunion
laborer with its lower wages and fewer benefits. By limiting the present employment
opportunities, the seniority standards used for job referral prevent the black worker
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This means that minority personnel who cannot gain union member-
ship are often severely limited in employment opportunities. Further-
more, the seniority standards used for job referrals by the union pre-
vent the accumulation of seniority for future employment opportuni-
ties.
The exclusion of minorities from the labor union is more con-
sequential in the craft unions where employment is traditionally sea-
sonal. Since employers are generally unable to utilize a permanent
labor force, the employee in a craft union must rely almost solely on
his position within the union structure for security.6 Because of this
dependence upon the union for job security, craft unions tend to be-
come tight-knit and united against outsider interference. The workers
perceive it to be in their immediate short-run interest to minimize the
competition for jobs by limiting the supply of qualified laborers and
to establish criteria for selection, retention, and referral that would
benefit themselves without necessarily benefiting the employer or the
industry.7 Recently, the effort to provide more job opportunities for
minorities has been viewed, perhaps with some justification, as a vital
threat to the job security of the craft union members.
Although state laws had begun to eliminate discrimination against
minority groups, it became increasingly clear by the early Sixties that
progress had been too slow and that national legislation was needed
to meet a national problem.8 As a result, federal legislation was
enacted which sought in part9 to eliminate persistent discrimination in
employment opportunities by providing broad effective remedial relief
for denials of equal protection of the laws on account of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."0
from ever accumulating sufficient seniority for future employment opportunities. See
Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1964: Racial Discrimination by Labor Unions, 16 ST.
JOHN's L. REv. 58, 60-64 (1954).
6. Morse, The Scope of Tudicial Relief Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 46 TExAs L. REv. 516, 518 (1968).
7. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Cmu. L. REv. 235, 251
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Fiss].
8. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, at 18 (1963). "'hat
need is evidenced, on the one hand, by a growing impatience by the victims of dis-
crimination with its continuance and, on the other hand, by a growing recognition on
the part of all of our people of the incompatibility of such discrimination with our
ideals and the principles to which this country is dedicated. . . . [The act] is de-
signed as a step toward eradicating significant areas of discrimination on a nation-
wide basis. It is general in application and national in scope."
9. Title V11, §§ 701-16, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-12 (1970). Title VII of the act
deals with equal employment opportunities.
10. The legislation also sought to eliminate discrimination in exercising the
right to vote, in gaining access to public facilities, in the receipt of federal financial
assistance, in the availability of public education, and in the area of obtaining ade-
quate housing.
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In the specific area of unionized labor, sections 703(c)" and
(d) 2 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act declared it to be an unlawful em-
ployment practice for a labor organization, within the purview of the
act, to discriminate either in membership requirements, employment
referrals or union training programs, on the basis of race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin. Section 706(g) 1" authorized broad
judicial relief, including "such affirmative relief as may be appropri-
ate," to alleviate unlawful discriminatory practices. Section 703(j) of
the act also restricted the courts' power by providing that no labor
organization can be required to grant preferential treatment to any
individual or group of individuals because of their race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, or because there may be an imbalance between
the composition of the community and the membership in a particular
labor organization. 4 In addition to individual actions brought under
the act, the attorney general, under section 707(a),' 5 can institute
suits to obtain relief from the discriminatory practices of a particular
11. The provisions of Title VII are not limited to acts of discrimination by
labor unions and their apprenticeship programs. Title VII, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1970), prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin by employers and section 703(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1970),
makes unlawful such discrimination by employment agencies. The relief provisions of
the act likewise apply to employers and employment agencies. Id. § 703(c)-(d),
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(c)-(d) (1970), provide:
"(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
"(1) to exclude . . . or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual be-
cause of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
"(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or fail or
refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would de-
prive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities . . . or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."
12. Id. § 703(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1970), makes it an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer, union, or joint labor-management committee to
discriminate due to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in its apprenticeship or
training program.
13. Id. § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970), provides that if the court
finds that the union or employer has intentionally discriminated against an individual
or group, the court can enjoin such discrimination and order whatever affirmative
relief is appropriate under the circumstances.
14. Id. § 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) prevents any labor organization or em-
ployer from granting preferential treatment to an individual or group because of an
imbalance in the racial, religious, sexual, or ethnic composition between such or-
ganization or employer and the community.
15. Id. § 707(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a), allows the attorney general to bring a
civil action against any person or group of persons engaging in a pattern or practice
of discrimination, and to request appropriate relief, including an application for a
permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or any other order that the at-
torney general deems necessary to protect the rights guaranteed under the act.
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employer or union when there is a "pattern or practice of resistance
to the rights" secured by the act, or when the pattern or practice "is
intended to deny the full exercise of the rights herein described."
In an effort to implement the provisions of the act, the courts
have been quite liberal in granting relief. Past decisions have ordered
the merger of unions,16 implementation of new seniority systems, 17
publication of new nondiscriminatory union policies,'8 development of
objective criteria for union membership,' 9 and revamping of appren-
ticeship programs.20 The courts have also granted specific relief to
individuals by ordering the union to immediately refer such individ-
uals to existing jobs.2' However, the ordering of such affirmative
relief by the courts has not been without criticism. The critics claim
that the mere availability of such relief has provided the courts with
the means to "meddle" in the internal affairs of the unions and that
certain relief ordered by the courts has allowed racial preferences and
imposed racial quotas on the unions in violation of 703 0).
The Ninth Circuit significantly expanded the type of affirmative
relief granted under the act in a recent case, United States v. Iron-
workers Local 86.22 The action was brought against the labor union
to eradicate alleged vestiges of past discriminatory practices, and the
court affirmed the lower court's order creating "special" apprenticeship
classes for blacks and establishing "minimum levels of participation"
by blacks in the regular apprenticeship programs conducted by the
unions involved.
This note will examine the affirmative relief ordered by the court
in terms of the statutory authority contained in the relief provisions
found in Title VU and the policy underlying the 1964 Civil Rights
Act eliminating all forms of discrimination in our society. The note
will conclude that the Ninth Circuit may have over-reached its power
by establishing "minimum levels of participation" by blacks.
Background: The Development of Case Law
Under Title VII
When the original bill for the 1964 Civil Rights Act was intro-
16. United States v. International Longshoreman's Ass'n, 319 F. Supp. 737 (D.
Md. 1970).
17. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d
980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
18. United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir.
1969).
19. Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
20. United States v. Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 73, 314 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.
Ind. 1969).
21. Id.; Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
22. 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971).
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duced before Congress, it was regarded as a drastic step and Title
VJI-which was part of the original bill-was no exception. The
provisions of Title VII gave rise to cries that employers and labor or-
ganizations would be yoked with "racial quotas" and would be forced
to give "preferences" to minority groups in order to escape the threat
of federal prosecution.2" The fears of "racial quotas" were somewhat
quieted by the fact that the act itself prohibited any form of discrim-
ination in hiring, including "reverse discrimination."24  In order to
put such fears permanently to rest, Senator Allott of Colorado proposed
an amendment to Title VII, later adopted as section 703(j), for the
specific purpose of providing that no unlawful employment practice
would be founded solely on the basis of racial imbalances.25
In the original wording of Title VII, the Equal Employment Op-
23. Under Title VII, § 707(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1970), when a labor
organization is engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination the attorney general
can bring a civil action in order to stop such discrimination. See note 15 supra.
24. "Contrary to the allegations of some opponents of this title, there is nothing
in it that will give any power to the Commission or to any court to require hiring,
firing, or promotion of employees in order to meet a racial "quota" or to achieve a
certain racial balance.
"That bugaboo has been brought up a dozen times; but it is nonexistent. In fact,
the very opposite is true. Title VII prohibits discrimination. In effect, it says that
race, religion, and national origin are not to be used as the basis for hiring and firing.
Title VII is designed to encourage hiring on the basis of ability and qualifications, not
race or religion." 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
"Title VII might justly be described as a modest step forward. Yet it is pictured
by its opponents and detractors as an intrusion of numerous Federal inspectors into
our economic life. These inspectors would presumably dictate to labor unions and
their members with regard to job seniority, seniority in apprenticeship programs,
racial balance in membership and preferential advancement for members of so-called
minority groups. Nothing could be further from the truth. . . . But the important
point, in response to the scare charges which have been widely circulated to local
unions throughout America, is that the court cannot order preferential hiring or pro-
motion consideration for any particular race, religion, or other group. Its power is
solely limited to ordering an end to the discrimination which is in fact occurring."
Id. at 6563 (remarks of Senator Kuchel).
25. Senator Allott of Colorado offered 703(j) as an amendment in its initial
form on May 4, 1964. Senator Allott introduced his amendment with the following
statement:
"Mr. President, I have heard over and over again in the last few weeks the charge
that title VII, the equal employment opportunity section, would impose a quota system
on employers and labor unions. . . . [The argument] is that an employer will hire
members of minority groups, regardless of their qualifications, to avoid having any
problems with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ....
"I do not believe title VII would result in. . . a quota system ....
"But the argument has been made and I know that employers are . . . concerned
with the argument. I have, therefore, prepared an amendment which I believe makes
it clear that no quota system will be imposed if title VII becomes law. Very briefly, it
provides that no finding of unlawful employment practice may be made solely on the
basis of racial imbalances." Id. at 9881.
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portunity Commission (EEOC) not only had the authority to conduct
investigations, but also to institute hearing procedures and issue cease-
and-desist orders. However, members of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee preferred that the courts and not the EEOC have the final
determination if the discrimination claim was disputed. The commit-
tee reasoned that the investiture of the district courts with such power
would encourage more rapid settlement of the complaints. Further-
more, the employer or labor union would have a more just forum
since a trial de novo would be required in district court proceedings
which would necessitate proof of discrimination by a preponderance of
the evidence. The EEOC was intended to confine its activities to
correcting abuses, short of imposing forced racial balances upon the
unions or employers. The internal affairs, management perogatives,
and union freedoms were to be left undisturbed to the greatest extent
possible. Still, opportunities for employment were not to be obstructed
due to racial prejudices and membership in unions or jobs with com-
panies were to be filled on the basis of nondiscriminatory qualifications.
In marked contrast to the limitations imposed on the relief which
could be given by the EEOC, the judicial interpretations of the relief
provisions of Title VII have been quite liberal. In several cases prior
to United States v. Ironworkers Local 86,26 the courts have granted
various types of affirmative relief. The courts, under essentially iden-
tical factual situations, have progressively broadened the scope of af-
firmative relief with no indication as to what would constitute the
outer limits of the courts' power under Title VII. In order to provide
some insight of the significance of the unique relief granted by the
Ninth Circuit in Local 86, the types of affirmative relief ordered by
the courts in earlier cases will be discussed in terms of the statutory
relief provisions under Title VIIY.
Many of the cases' 8 which have interpreted and integrated the
26. 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 447 (1971).
27. See notes 11-15 & accompanying text supra.
28. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (usage of intelligence tests
as a condition of employment); United States v. Electrical Workers Local 38, 428
F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970) (modification of referral sys-
tem); Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970) (suspension of seniority system);
United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969) (pub-
lication of the fact that membership and related benefits were open to all persons and
an affirmative duty of minority recruitment); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp.,
415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969) (changing seniority systems); Local 53, Asbestos
Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) (striking down nepotism member-
ship requirement); United States v. Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 73, 314 F. Supp. 160
(S.D. Ind. 1969) (revamping apprenticeship programs); Dobbins v. Electrical Workers
Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968) (suspended operation of referral
system).
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provisions of Title VII into an effective means of eliminating discrim-
ination cite approvingly the language of the Supreme Court in Louis-
iana v. United States2" in which the Court declared:
the [district] court has not merely the power but the duty to
render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the dis-
criminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination
in the future.30
This statement has been referred to repeatedly by the courts in order
to establish a foundation upon which to base the affirmative relief
granted under Title VII.31
Dobbins v. Electrical Workers Local 212,2 decided in 1968, was
one of the first cases under Title VII to reach the district court level.
The district judge cited the language of the Supreme Court in Louisi-
ana and declared that the court was obligated to utilize the full and
lasting resources of equity in granting specific remedial relief to insure
blacks the full enjoyment of the right to an equal opportunity in em-
ployment. The court held that if affirmative relief was necessary in
order to correct the effects of prior patterns and practices of discrim-
ination then such relief was both necessary and proper.33 In its find-
ings of discrimination the court noted that the union had denied blacks
union membership, job referrals, and other employment opportunities
because of their race or color. The court further found that the
union had discriminated against the blacks by giving priority in work
referrals to persons who had work experience under a collective bar-
gaining agreement and at the same time denying blacks the opportu-
nity to gain such experience. In addition, the union had applied differ-
ent membership standards to specific individuals." The court, how-
ever, carefully rejected the contention that Title VII required a union
to take affirmative action to relieve the present-day result of pre-act
discrimination, because such action would constitute the granting of
29. 380 U.S. 145 (1965). This was an action brought under the 1957 Civil
Rights Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments seeking to have an interpre-
tation and citizenship test which was a prerequisite for voter registration set aside.
Since Louisiana did involve racial discrimination in voter registration, the courts have
in actions brought under Title VII relied on the general policy declared in Louisiana
that the courts must correct the effects of past discrimination as well as bar future
discriminatory acts. This language has provided a guideline in Title VII cases as
to the desired federal policy behind the 1964 Civil Rights Act if racial discrimination
and its badges are to be eliminated from our society.
30. 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
31. See, e.g., Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States,
416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Dobbins v. Elec-
trical Workers Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
32. 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
33. Id. at 447.
34. Id. at 443, 446. See notes 2-3 supra.
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preferential treatment in violation of section 703(j). 35 Since the gov-
ernment had failed to show that the alleged discrimination involved a
significant number of people, the court refused to strike down the
entire referral system, and instead, temporarily suspended the existing
referral system until a new system could be developed which would
eliminate the distinctions based on union membership, journeymen's
examinations, or work experience under a union contract. 36
In discussing the type of relief available, the court held that the
newly enacted civil rights act did not apply retroactively. The only
acts of discrimination or effects of past discrimination which could
be remedied under the act were those that occurred after July 2, 1965.
Although in general agreement with the rationale of Louisiana, the
court considered itself limited by the express language of Title VII
and refused to grant any type of affirmative relief not specifically pro-
vided in the act itself.3" Even though the court recognized it had
broad equitable powers to grant relief under the rationale of the Su-
preme Court in Louisiana, it felt constrained to grant only prospective
relief which would comply with the prohibitions against the granting
of preferences contained in 7030).
An additional significant point contained in Dobbins was the fact
that the district court premised its decision on a careful review of both
the legislative debates and the provisions of the act, an approach
which has not been followed generally by the appellate courts in later
cases involving Title VII 38 For example, in two later cases39 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to follow the restrictive view of
Dobbins and instead broadened the type of relief available under Title
VML
35. Id. at 444. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the discussion of
Senators Dirksen, Humphrey, and Clark in the Senate during the debate on the act
to support its holding that Title VII does not require an employer union to give any
minority group preferential treatment on account of a racial imbalance. See note
24 supra.
36. Id. at 453.
37. "EThe union] is not required to run a school to advance the skill of any
group discriminated against prior to July, 1965; it is not required to seek out in-
dividuals in that group who may be competent for referral . . . and that even though
membership or referral has been discriminatorily denied prior to the Act." Id. at 445.
The court also stated that there was nothing in Title VII which required the union to
publicize its policies either generally or to the black community specifically with re-
gard to admission or job referrals. The court's conclusion was based primarily on the
finding that the union had discontinued its discriminatory practices prior to the date
the act became effective.
38. See, e.g., Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir.
1969).
39. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d
980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Local 53, Asbestos Workers v.
Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
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The first case, Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler,40 was an
action challenging the union's nepotistic practice of limiting member-
ship to sons or relatives of present members. The court held that the
union's policies regarding membership and job referrals discriminated
on the basis of race and national origin.41 In formulating the relief to
be granted, the Fifth Circuit declared, "the courts are not limited to
simply parroting the Act's prohibitions but are permitted, if not re-
quired, to 'order such affirmative action as may be appropriate.' ",42 The
court rejected the union's contention that the order of the lower court
which required the admission of four individuals into the union and
the referral of nine others to available jobs constituted preferential
racial treatment or the establishment of a quota system.43 In addition,
the court held that if found necessary to insure compliance with the act,
the district court was also empowered to eliminate any vestiges of
past discrimination. 44 The court rejected the union's assertion that the
order penalized it for pre-act discrimination and stated that by elim-
inating membership policies which served no significant trade-related
purpose, and which had originally been instituted-at least in part
because of a racially discriminatory attitude-and which in fact re-
sulted in the exclusion of blacks, the order was merely aimed at pre-
venting future acts of discrimination. By thus interpreting the order
as a prevention of future discrimination, the court circumvented the
relief limitations set forth in section 703(j). The court reasoned that
even though the union's practice of limiting membership to sons or
relatives of present members would have applied equally to whites .as
well as blacks, the fact that there were no Negro or Mexican-American
members in the union would have precluded the future admission of
such members. In summary, the court utilized Title VII to eradicate
a type of discrimination which was not strictly based on race or na-
tional origin but rather on lineage or friendship. In contrast to Dob-
bins, Vogler stands for the proposition that the granting of affirmative
relief is appropriate under Title VII to correct the effects of past
discrimination. The court thus rejected the views expressed in Dob-
bins, and later cases have relied on the reasoning expressed in Vogler
40. 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
41. Id. at 1050. In the four years preceding the date of this action, Local 53
had accepted seventy-two first-year improvers (apprentices) as members. Sixty-nine
of these were sons or stepsons of members; each of the other three was a nephew
who was raised by a member as a son. Only such sons were considered for mem-
bership.
42. Id. at 1052. The court relied heavily on the reasoning of Louisiana and the
the district court decision in Local 189 in holding that the district court was empowered
to eliminate the present effects of past discrimination.
43. Id. at 1051.
44. Id. at 1052-53.
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to justify the particular relief ordered by them.45
In the second Fifth Circuit case, Local 189, United Papermakers
& Paperworkers v. United States,48 job vacancies at the Crown Zeller-
bach plant were filled on the basis of job seniority-time actually
spent on a particular job-rather than mill seniority-total employment
time at the plant. Prior to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
blacks had been relegated to job classifications which were severely
limited in terms of advancement opportunities. Because of these in-
herent limitations in the job classifications, seniority acquired by blacks'
was virtually meaningless in terms of advancement opportunities. After
passage of the act, virtually all of the various job classifications were
opened up to blacks; however, the job seniority system remained the
same. As a result, even though many positions were technically avail-
able to blacks, the job seniority system tended to keep blacks who had
been employed prior to the passage of the act in the same segregated
job classifications. The unions contended that even though the senior-
ity system had the effect of conditioning future employment oppor-
tunities upon a previously determined racial status, the system was
itself racially neutral and therefore not in violation of Title VII. 47
The court, however, disagreed and stated that the job seniority system
embodied the racially determined effects of a biased past and thus
constituted a form of present racial discrimination which was therefore
within the remedial powers of Title VII.48 One of the major diffi-
culties with this interpretation of Title VII was clearly noted by the
courts observation that "the crux of the problem is how far the em-
ployer must go to undo the effects of past discrimination." 49
The court ordered that the job seniority system be discontinued
and a mill seniority system be instituted in its place. The court cited
Vogler for the proposition that the court was fully empowered to elim-
inate the present effects of past discrimination in extending Title VII
to eliminate an existing seniority system. The court countered the ar-
gument that the legislative history indicated the intent to leave existing
seniority systems alone 0 by pointing out:
[Tihe treatment of "job" or "department seniority" raises problems
different from those discussed in the Senate debates: "a depart-
ment seniority system that has its genesis in racial discrimination
is not a bona fide seniority system." 5' 1
45. See, e.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123
(8th Cir. 1969).
46. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
47. Id. at 988.
48. Id. at 990.
49. Id. at 988.
50. Id. at 987 & n.8.
51. Id. at 995.
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These two cases provide a different approach than that taken in
Dobbins in that the court circumvented the expressed legislative intent
set forth in the Senate debates and relied instead on the vague wording
of section 706(g) authorizing "such affirmative relief as may be ap-
propriate," as justification for according affirmative relief for past dis-
crimination. However, the two cases discussed above deal only nega-
tively with the limitations of section 703 (j). That is, even though
both decisions stated that the relief granted does not violate the pro-
hibitions in the section against granting preferential treatment, no in-
sight is provided as to just what exactly is prohibited by the section.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals followed the lead of the
Fifth Circuit in granting affirmative relief to counteract past discrim-
ination in United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36.12 The
case differed somewhat from earlier Title VII cases because there were
no allegations that the union had discriminated against any specific in-
dividual.5" Prior to 1967, the union had prohibited blacks from join-
ing the union, from taking the journeyman's examination, and from
using the union hiring hall.54 Although the union had ceased these
open acts of discrimination in 1967, it continued to accord job re-
ferral priorities under a system based on the amount of pre-act work
experience under a collective bargaining agreement. Since there had
been no black union members during this period it was alleged that
the union's referral system carried forward the effects of former dis-
criminatory practices and thus resulted in present and future discrim-
ination in violation of Title VII. 5 The Eighth Circuit ordered that
both the referral system and the collective bargaining agreement be
modified to eliminate the pre-act work experience requirement and per-
mit minorities who were reasonably qualified to register for employ-
ment at the hiring hall and to be placed in the highest referral group
for which they were qualified. 6 The court followed the example of
Vogler and Local 189 and quickly disposed of any purported limitation
imposed by Section 703 (j) by declaring "in requiring the modifica-
tions, we impose no quotas, we grant no preferences. '5 7 The court
also ordered the union to publicize in the black community that mem-
bership and related benefits were open to all regardless of race. As
previously discussed,58 the court in Dobbins had theorized that none
52. 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
53. Id. at 132.
54. Id. at 131.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 132.
57. Id. at 133.
58. See note 37 supra.
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of the provisions in the act required such publicity.59 However, the
Eighth Circuit carefully noted that in Dobbins the discriminatory acts
had ceased prior to July 2, 1965, the effective date of the act, while
in Local 36, the discriminatory acts continued until 1967.60 More
importantly, the court stated that authority to grant affirmative relief
was not limited by section 703(j) of the act. 61 The preference of
the court to grant broad equitable relief in spite of the express pro-
visions of the act, thus appeared to be gaining momentum.
The Sixth Circuit followed the growing trend in United Slates
v. Electrical Workers Local 38,02 and granted affirmative relief on the
basis that it was necessary to alleviate the continuing effect of the
union's past discriminatory practices. When the action alleging dis-
crimination was brought, the union had 1,318 members, two of whom
were black; there were also 255 apprentices, three of whom were
black. In the immediately preceding year the union had referred
3,487 persons for work in the electrical trades through its hiring hall-
only two of the referrals were black. The court found that prior to
1967, the union's referral procedures utilized priorities established ac-
cording to work experience gained under collective bargaining agree-
ments during a period when there were no blacks in the union. The
union also utilized subjective criteria for admitting individuals to the
apprenticeship programs, and these criteria had a differential impact
upon blacks. Furthermore, the union had a poor reputation in the
black community with regard to employment opportunities for blacks,
largely because of its past policies. The court ordered the suspension
of the referral system, the establishment of objective criteria for admission
to the union and its programs, and the publication in the black com-
munity of the new nondiscriminatory policies of the union. In ordering
this affirmative relief, the court followed the lead of the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits and declared:
When the stated purposes of the Act and the broad affirmative
relief authorization [in section 2000e-6] are read in context with
with § 2000e-2(j), we believe that section cannot be construed
as a ban on affirmative relief against continuation of effects
of past discrimination resulting from present practices (neutral
on their face) which have the practical effect of continuing
past injustices.
Any other interpretation would allow complete nullification
of the stated purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.63
59. Dobbins v. Electrical Workers Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio
1968).
60. United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123, 140 (8th
Cir. 1969).
61. Id.
62. 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
63. Id. at 149.
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The United States Supreme Court has not yet interpreted the
relief provisions of Title VII; however, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.64
the Court considered whether an employer was prohibited under the
1964 Civil Rights Act from requiring a high school education and the
passing of a standardized intelligence test as a condition for employ-
ment or job transfer.
In holding that the valdity of utilizing such standards depended
upon a showing that they reasonably measure job performance, the
Court stated that the objective of Congress in enacting Title VII was
to
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove bar-
riers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable
group of white employees over other employees. Under the
Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they
operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory em-
ployment practices.6 5
The Court further held, however, that the act was not intended to pro-
vide racial preferences, but rather was intended to promote hiring on
the basis of qualifications without consideration of race. 6 Neither the
high school completion requirement nor the general intelligence test
was shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to the successful com-
pletion of the job and the use of these standards was therefore barred
by Title VII. Though the Court did not specifically refer to affirma-
tive relief under the act, there is language in the opinion to the effect
that remnants of past discrimination must be eliminated if they control
the future availability of employment opportunities.
To summarize, the cases discussed in this section show the de-
velopment of a theory of "broad equitable power" utilized by the
courts to justify affirmative relief for past discriminatory practices.
The courts have successively broadened the scope of permissible rem-
edies available for eradicating the remaining effects of past discrim-
ination. This progression of affirmative relief has continued without
any hint of limitation, in spite of the language of section 703(j),67
which has been effectively circumvented by the courts. The affirma-
tive relief recently ordered by the Ninth Circuit under Title VII has
expanded this judicial trend to what may appear to be a logical,
though not necessarily legal conclusion.
64. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
65. Id. at 429-430.
66. Id. at 434.
67. See text accompanying notes 16-21 supra.
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Ninth Circuit-Affirmative Relief Under Title VII
The Holding
In United States v. Ironworkers Local 8668 the action was orig-
inally brought in the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Washington" alleging discriminatory practices, in violation of
Title VII by the unions7" and the joint apprenticeship training com-
mittees (JATCs) .7 The alleged discriminatory practices included the
following: (1) the utilization of tests and admission criteria which had
no relation to any skills required on the job-this was the type of
illegal practice alleged in Griggs; (2) the active recruitment of whites
with little or no publicity in the black community of information re-
garding procedures for gaining union membership, work referral op-
portunities, or the operation of apprenticeship training programs-this
was the type of illegal practice rectified by the court in Local 36 and
Local 38; (3) a nepotistic admission policy by the union-like Vog-
ler's; (4) differential application of membership requirements, often
waiving such requirements for whites-similar to Dobbins; (5) the
turning away of qualified black workers seeking job referrals either
without reason or with a spurious explanation; and (6) implementation
of a referral system which carried forth the effects of past discrimina-
tion by giving referral priority according to experience under a col-
lective bargaining agreement when blacks were deterred from gaining
such experience 7 2-similar to Local 189, Local 36, and Local 38.
The district court placed heavy emphasis on statistical data which
showed a large disparity between the racial composition of the unions
and the city of Seattle73 and entered judgment on behalf of the plain-
68. 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 447 (1971).
69. 315 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
70. Local 86, International Association of Bridge, Structural, and Ornamental
Ironworkers; Local 46, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; Local 32,
United Association of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of the United States;
Local 32, International Union of Operating Engineers; Local 99, International Sheet
Metal Workers Association.
71. Ironworkers Joint Apprenticeship Training Committee; Plumbers & Pipe-
fitters Joint Apprenticeship and Training Committee; Sheet Metal Workers Joint
Apprenticeship and Training Committee.
72. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 548 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 92 S. Ct. 447 (1971).
73. Ironworkers Local 86 had approximately 920 members in January 1970,
only one of whom was black. 315 F. Supp. at 1204. Sheet Metal Workers Local 99
had approximately 900 members in its construction division, only one of whom was
black. id. at 1212. Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 32 had approximately 1900 mem-
bers in its construction group, only one of whom was black. Id. at 1219. Electrical
Workers Local 46 had approximately 1750 members in the construction wiremen's unit,
two of whom were black. Id. at 1228. The Sheet Metal Workers had 100 appren-
tices indentured, seven of whom were black. Id. at 1215. The Plumbers & Pipe-
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tiffs and against the unions and the JATCs involved. The court en-
joined the unions from future discrimination with respect to job re-
ferrals and membership in the union; ordered the dissemination of in-
formation in the black community regarding referral opportunities,
admission policies, and apprenticeship programs; granted specific re-
lief to certain individuals by ordering immediate job referral; modified
the union's job referral system and the criteria for union membership.74
The court also ordered the JATCs to disperse information throughout
the black community concerning the requirements and admission pro-
cedures for the apprenticeship programs and to refrain from all future
acts of discrimination against blacks. 75
Most importantly, the court purported to eliminate traces of past
discrimination by ordering the creation of special apprenticeship classes
for blacks,76 in addition to ordering the selection of a sufficient num-
ber of blacks under the regular apprenticeship programs to overcome
the effects of past discrimination.7 7  The court set forth guidelines to
be utilized by the JATCs for determining the number of blacks to be
selected for the apprenticeship programs-a sufficient number to in-
sure a minimum level"' equal to thirty percent of each class to the
extent that there are blacks on the list of qualified apprenticeship ap-
plicants. The court anticipated that these guidelines and the special
apprenticeship programs, in conjunction with the notification provided
the black community concerning employment opportunities in the
trades, would create a continuing influx of qualified black workers into
the unions and would thus eliminate any traces of the unions' past
discriminatory policies.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit was faced primarily with the issue
of whether the lower court had overreached the remedial authority
provided for under the act. At the outset, the appellate court sus-
stained the district court's finding that the statistical evidence showed
a marked absence of blacks in both the unions and the apprenticeship
fitters had 104 building trades apprentices, none of whom were black. Id. at 1224.
In the city of Seattle, approximately 42,000 blacks reside, consisting of roughly seven
percent of the population. Id. at 1234.
74. Id. at 1237-44.
75. Id. at 1245-52.
76. These special classes were to be designed to meet the special needs of black
applicants who had either no previous job experience or skills, or, who may have had
some previous experience or skills in the trade which was insufficient to meet the
journeyman standards established by the union. Id. at 1247.
77. Id.
78. "[T]he phrase 'minimum participation of blacks' refers to participation both
in the class of persons entering the apprentice program and the class of persons re-
maining in the program more than three months. Blacks whose apprenticeships
terminate in three months or less shall be replaced with newly indentured black ap-
prentices to insure the required participation by blacks." Id.
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programs. 7  The court further agreed that the absence of blacks was
primarily attributable to vestiges of discrimination in the unions' re-
ferral systems and the utilization of employment practices which had a
differential impact upon blacks.80
Following its affirmance of the lower court's finding of fact, the
Ninth Circuit concentrated on the unions' contention that the relief
granted by the district court violated section 703(j) because the court's
orders granted "racial preferences" and imposed "racial quotas." Spe-
cifically, the unions objected to giving immediate job referrals to blacks
as had been ordered by the court. Further, the unions objected to the
court's order to include, under judicially imposed minimums, a suffi-
cient number of black applicants in the apprenticeship programs to
overcome past discrimination. The court rejected the unions' conten-
tions and held that the district court neither abused its discretion in
ordering relief under the act, nor did the orders of the lower court
in any way establish a system of racial quotas or preferences."'
Ninth Circuit's Authority
In rejecting the unions' contentions that the district court, in cre-
ating minimum percentage requirements for participation of blacks in
the apprentice programs had exceeded its authority under the act, the
Ninth Circuit cited the relief provisions in the act which allows the
courts to "enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful em-
ployment practice, and order such affirmative relief as may be ap-
propriate . *.". ."8 Of course, by interpreting the relief provisions in
the act in this manner, the court reasoned that there were no specific
limitations in the act as to the type of relief granted, so long as such
relief did not grant preferential treatment. Therefore, relief ordered
by the district court was not specifically prohibited under the act. The
result of this type of interpretation is that there are no objective stand-
ards for determining the prermissible scope of the court's discretion in
granting affirmative relief.
The court further justified the propriety of the relief granted by
the district court with the statement that the
court is vested with broad remedial power to remove the ves-
tiges of past discrimination and eliminate present and assure
the nonexistence of future barriers to the full enjoyment of equal
job opportunities by qualified black workers.83
79. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 552-53 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 447 (1971).
80. Id. at 552.
81. Id. at 554.
82. 443 F.2d at 553. See Title VII, § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
83. 443 F.2d at 553.
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This broad policy statement has also been utilized by other courts-for
example in Vogler-to justify modification of the job referral systems,
merger of unions, elimination of nepotistic admission policies, revamp-
ing of apprenticeship programs, development of objective criteria for
union membership, and the granting of specific relief to particular in-
dividuals by ordering immediate work referral or union membership.8"
In none of the prior cases, however, was any consideration given to
the establishment of minimum percentage quotas for determining the
number of minority group individuals to be admitted into the unions'
apprenticeship programs, as was approved by the Ninth Circuit in
Local 86. The Ninth Circuit specifically cited Vogler in support of its
position that the minimum percentage requirements did not constitute
a quota system.85 Why the court deemed Vogler pertinent is not
clear because the Vogler court ordered the admission of four discrim-
inatees and the development of objective criteria for union member-
ship and size; it did not order imposition of any percentage level of
blacks to be admitted to the union's apprenticeship programs.
As a last stone in the "wall of authority" cited in support of its
decision, the court again referred to the view previously expressed in
both Vogler and Local 38 to the effect that the district court was
fully empowered to eliminate the present effects of past discrimina-
tion.8 To hold otherwise, noted the court, "would allow a complete
nullification of the purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."81
To summarize, even though Vogler and Local 38, on which the
court so heavily relies, were based upon similar factual situations to
that of Local 86; in neither case did the court find the necessity nor the
desirability of establishing minimum levels of participation in union
apprenticeship programs. In Vogler the Fifth Circuit eliminated a
union's nepotistic admission policies, while in Local 38 the Sixth Cir-
cuit suspended a discriminatory job referral system, established ob-
jective union membership criteria, and ordered the publication in the
black community of the new nondiscriminatory union policies. The
Ninth Circuit was faced with allegations of discriminatory union prac-
tices which were factually similar to Vogler and Local 38, and the
court apparently utilized the reasoning of these two prior cases while
achieving an entirely different result.
Thus, while the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Local 86 clearly
continues the earlier trend in expanding the available forms of affirma-
84. See text accompanying notes 16-21 supra.
85. 443 F.2d at 553-54, citing Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407
F.2d 1047, 1054 (5th Cir. 1969).
86. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 554 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 92 S. Ct. 447 (1971).
87. Id.
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tive relief under the act, the court appears to have gone significantly
further than other courts by establishing percentage requirements for
minority participation. The court's reliance upon the general wording
of the relief provisions of the act, and the citation of general policy
statements uttered by the courts in Vogler and Local 38 would not
appear to fully justify the conclusion that the action taken in Local 86
was well within the scope of affirmative relief granted by the courts
in other Title VII cases.
The Proper Use of Statistics Under Title VII
In affirming the lower court's imposition of minimum percentage
requirements for minority membership in the union's apprenticeship
programs, the Ninth Circuit held that the findings of discriminatory
practices were well documented with statistical evidence which showed
a distinct absence of blacks in both the unions and the apprenticeship
programs. The court also cited a number of cases in which the courts
had utilized statistics to prove racial discrimination under Title VII.88
Courts have also utilized statistics to substantiate discriminatory
practices in such areas as voting89 and jury selection;9 however, the
racial statistics have been utilized in three different ways: 1) to trig-
ger enforcement action, such as the initiation of investigation; 2) to
shift the burden of proof to the party accused of discrimination-mak-
ing him prove that he has not discriminated; and 3) to formulate
specific employment objectives under a decree designed to eliminate
traces of past discrimination.9" The courts which have utilized racial
statistics generally point out the extreme care which is necessary in
order to prevent the formation of unfounded inferences. For example,
the mere existence of a racial imbalance should not serve as the sole
basis for the finding of an unlawful employment practice by the
unions. 92
In Local 86 the Ninth Circuit cited the absence or near absence
of blacks from the unions and their programs as a "red flag," indicating
88. Id. at 550. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Patton v.
Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Norris v. Ala-
bama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). See generally Fiss, supra note 7.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Louisiana, 380 U.S. 145 (1964).
90. See, e.g., Carmical v. Craven, 451 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1971), petition for
rehearing filed June 13, 1971.
91. Fiss, supra note 7, at 268.
92. There are causes other than racial discrimination that may explain the ab-
sence or low numbers of blacks within the unions and the apprenticeship programs.
The imbalance might be due to a lack of the requisite skills that are usually necessary
to hold a job in the construction trades or it may be due to a lack of interest by
blacks resulting from the poor pay and long period of indenture in the apprenticeship
programs. Id. at 270.
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the possibility that the unions had followed unlawful employment prac-
tices. As one commentator has noted, the use of racial statistics to
trigger enforcement action
is based on the indisputable proposition that one necessary con-
sequence of racial discrimination is racial imbalance. If the
employer discriminates against Negroes on the basis of race,
there will be no Negroes or very few. This use of racial
statistics does not imply that racial discrimination should be
reduced to or equated with racial imbalancef 3
The Ninth Circuit was careful to point out, in rejecting the
unions' categorization of such proof as a statistical "numbers game"
which was incapable of proving a violation of Title VII,94 that the
statistical evidence was "complementary rather than exclusive."' 5  The
court explained that the lower court had not relied on statistical data
alone as the basis for its findings but had also cited specific instances of
discrimination on the part of the unions and the apprenticeship com-
mittees. The court went on to explain that the statistical imbalance
between the racial composition of the unions and the community
merely served to alert the attorney general, who thereupon conducted
an investigation and discovered that the statistical imbalance was due
to the unlawful employment practices of the unions and apprenticeship
committees. Thus, the holding of the court was centered around
these specific instances of discrimination and not the racial imbalance."
In addition to the fact that the statistical imbalance had been
utilized to trigger investigation of the unions and the apprenticeship
committees by the attorney general, the statistics were further utilized
by the trial court to raise the inference that the imbalance resulted
because of racial discrimination. This inference had the effect of shift-
ing the burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden
of persuasion to the unions.97 Courts have justified the use of such an
inference on the basis that in many civil rights cases the only "avail-
able avenue of proof is the use of racial statistics to uncover clandestine
93. Id. at 269-70.
94. 443 F.2d at 550.
95. Id. at 551.
96. "[A]s is the case with all statistics, their use is conditioned by the
existence of proper supportive facts and the absence of variables which would undermine
the reasonableness of the inference of discrimination which is drawn. It is our
belief that the often-cited aphorism, 'statistics often tell much and Courts listen,' has
particular application in Title VII cases." Id.
97. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Electrical Workers Local 38, 428 F.2d 144,
151 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1971); United States v. Sheet Metal
Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Hayes, 415 F.2d
1038 (5th Cir. 1969); EEOC v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 311 F. Supp. 468
(S.D. Ohio 1970).
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and covert discrimination by the employer or union involved." 95 Be-
cause in many of the cases it is highly improbable that the union can
show the cause of the statistical imbalance to have been something other
than racial discrimination, the imposition of such an inference by the
courts is often determinative of the outcome. Because of the con-
clusive effect of such an inference, the courts have been reluctant to
establish the inference solely on the basis of racial statistics,99 and
generally require not only that other methods of proof be unavailable
to the plaintiff,10 but that the alleged racial discrimination be sup-
ported by other evidence. 1°1  Such evidence may include: (1) con-
sideration of the economic context surrounding the situation;10 2 (2)
the presence of suspicious circumstances;' 03 (3) and the existence of
specific instances of racial discrimination.' 0 4  Though the supportive
evidence, considered alone, may not be enough to justify the raising
of an inference of discriminatory conduct by the unions, when the
supportive evidence is viewed in conjunction with all the circumstances
including the statistical racial imbalance the utilization of an inference
against the unions may be more clearly supported.
In Local 86, the Ninth Circuit modified the approach taken by
the Eighth Circuit in another Title VII case' 0 5 in which the court had
based its finding of an unlawful employment practice in violation of
98. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d .544, 551 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 92 S. Ct. 447 (1971).
99. See generally Swanm V. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971); United States v. Montgomery Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969); United
States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971); Alabama v. United
States, 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.) aff'd per curiam, 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
100. Other methods of proof may be unavailable because: (1) the race of the
applicants may be unknown; (2) the employer or union may maintain inadequate
records; (3) the cost of maintaining adequate personnel records may be prohibitive;
(4) of the utilization of subjective hiring criteria; (5) there may be few black appli-
cants and therefore no means of making a comparison. Fiss, supra note 7, at 271.
101. Id.
102. In the construction trade unions where the prospect for self regulation on
the merit principle has proven to be slim, the existence of a racial imbalance would
have some tendency to reinforce the allegation of discrimination on account of this
past conduct. Id. at 273.
103. For example, such circumstances were present in Local 86 in that the iron-
worker's union required black applicants for union membership to possess skill in knot
tying. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 315 F. Supp. 1202, 1206 (W.D. Wash.
1970).
104. If only one or two specific instances could be shown, however, general
injunctive relief might be inappropriate because section 707(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6
(a), requires a "pattern or practice" of conduct that creates a substantial risk that the
discriminatory conduct will recur. Isolated incidents of discrimination, however, lend
credibility to the inferences arising from the statistics that the union has pursued a
general discriminatory policy. Fiss, supra note 7, at 272.
105. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1970).
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the act solely on a statistical showing of an extraordinarily small num-
ber of black employees in the offending company. The Ninth Circuit
cited the numerous instances of specific acts of discrimination against
blacks by both the unions and the apprenticeship committees as the
basis for its holding that Title VII had been violated.
After affirming the findings of discrimination, the Ninth Circuit
proceeded to review the affirmative measures ordered by the lower
court to remedy the existing situation. In affirming the order to the
unions to achieve a "minimum level of participation" by blacks in
the apprenticeship programs equal to thirty percent of each class, the
Ninth Circuit became the first court under Title VII to use statistics
to define performance goals.106
The author's contention is that the establishment of performance
objectives based on statistical representation should be reserved for
the exceptional cases where there is little hope of eliminating the
vestiges of past discrimination through any other means. As a mini-
mum, the following conditions should be met before such performance
objectives are resorted to by the courts: (1) there should be a judicial
determination that the union or employer is engaged in an intentional
pattern or practice of discrimination; (2) other methods of affirmative
relief are found to be either impractical or have been previously at-
tempted and have failed to remedy the situation. For example, changes
in employment procedures under the watchful eye of the court may
be sufficient to accomplish the necessary result.
If despite the above conditions, reliance on performance goals
is found to be necessary, the court should establish a periodic hearing
procedure in which testimony could be taken to help guide the court's
hand in its quest to ascertain the correct employment goal to impose
upon the union or employer.' 0 7 Had the above recommendations been
implemented by the Ninth Circuit, the court could have eliminated
discriminatory practices and also avoided the necessity of circuitous
reasoning in attempting to avoid the prohibitions against preferential
treatment set forth in section 703(j). Also of significance is the fact
that the Ninth Circuit found it unnecessary to fully consider the af-
firmative relief previously granted by the courts under Title VII-mod-
ification of job referral programs; establishment of objective admission
criteria for both the unions and the apprenticeship programs; publica-
tion in the black community of these new nondiscriminatory policies;
elimination of discriminatory and nepotistic admission practices; and
106. The term "goal" is defined in this context in terms of requiring designated
percentages of blacks in the union's membership and apprenticeship programs, subject
to review by the court. If the union's performance deviates from this goal, it will be
"punished," unless it can adequately explain the deviation. Fiss, supra note 7, at 273.
107. Id. at 274.
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active recruitment programs of minorities previously discriminated
against. While it is true that the affirmative relief granted in these
prior cases108 has yet been inconclusive insofar as concerns the suc-
cess or failure in eliminating discrimination, it is also true that the
use of statistical goals to eliminate discrimination, as was ordered by
the Ninth Circuit, risks violation of the prohibition on the granting of
preferential treatment to minorities under section 703(j) of the act.
The court's reliance on the general relief provisions set forth in sec-
tion 706(g) which authorize "such affirmative relief as may be ap-
propriate" could arguably justify the imposition of the statistical per-
formance goals or quotas. However, the court would have been on
a surer footing had it waited to impose such statistical goals after the
failure of earlier court ordered relief. In Local 86, however, the
Ninth Circuit imposed the statistical goals without first attempting
any other types of affirmative relief, thus permitting the inference to
be drawn that the basis for the court's action was indeed the statistical
racial imbalance.
Another troublesome aspect of the court's imposition of the sta-
tistical goals for minority membership is that no specific guidelines
were established as to how or when the thirty percent statistical levels
were to be achieved. In addition, there were no evidentiary hearings
to establish an accurate statistical norm-how many black union mem-
bers would there have been had there been no discriminatory practices.
There is general recognition that statistical norms are more diffi-
cult to determine in the employment area due to the large number of
variables which must be taken into consideration' 09 -for example,
such factors as the skill and ability levels of the blacks within the com-
munity, particular job preferences, the alternative job opportunities
available at the time, the minority population of the area, geographical
boundaries of the labor market, the demand for labor by the industry,
and the attrition rate of the unions. Because of the many variables,
it would have been appropriate for the court to have conducted a
hearing in order to gather testimony of experts as the basis for establish-
108. See, e.g., Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); United States v.
Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 73, 314 F. Supp. 160 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
109. In some areas covered by the antidiscrimination prohibition, such as juries
and voting, it is relatively easy to construct the statistical norm. It is a function of
certain demographic data, namely the percentage of blacks of a certain age in the
total population of that age in the community. Thus, in voting, for example, the
statistical norm could be constructed from the voting age population; and even if
there were literacy tests, a fairly simple index, such as completion of the sixth grade
of school, could be used to delineate the relevant racial populations. And such in-
formation is easily available in public documents, such as census reports. However,
in the employment area it is more difficult to construct the statistical norm for a par-
ticular employer. Fiss, supra note 7, at 276.
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ing a reasonable and just level of minority participation for the unions
to meet. In the absence of such a hearing, the thirty percent goal
established by the court can only be viewed as an uninformed guess
which gives rise to a large chance for error.
The difficulties inherent in determining the proper statistical norm
and the awareness of the cost of an error compel caution, but
not the conclusion that all such uses of racial statistics are
impermissible. . . . The question should not be one of per-
mitting the use of racial statistics for enforcement purposes but,
rather, whether in each case the appropriate conditions are satis-
fied and whether the statistical norm is accurate."10
If the performance goal ignores pertinent employment factors and is
merely set equal to the percentage of blacks within the community,
there is a strong possibility that the norm will be too high. The
pressure on the unions and employers to meet the unrealistic level
may result in the admission or hiring of blacks strictly because of their
color, which would, in turn, violate merit principles and the basic
prohibitions against preferential treatment in Title VII. In other words,
when a black is admitted to a union strictly because of his color, a
white is being denied an equal employment opportunity."'
In Local 86 the performance goals for black membership were
set by the court at thirty percent for each apprenticeship class. This
relatively high level would appear to err on the high side;" 2 however,
this is entirely a matter for conjecture since the court failed to indicate
how the thirty percent level was determined. The order by the court
110. Id. at 281.
111. Id. at 280. A Washington state trial judge recently ruled that the admission
preference accorded minority students by the University of Washington's School of
Law violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The denial of
equal protection, the court held, was in the fact that the law school admitted, in pur-
suance of a policy to make legal education more available to minority groups, several
minority applicants having lower predicted first-year averages than the white applicant
who challenged his rejection. The court required the school to admit the rejected
student.
In an oral decision the trial judge stated, "It seems to me that the law school here
wished to achieve greater minority representation and in accomplishing this gave
preference to the members of some races. . . . Some minority students were ad-
mitted whose college grades and aptitude test scores were so low that had they been
whites their applications would have been summarily denied. Excluding Asians, only
one minority student out of thirty-one admitted among the applicants had a pre-
dicted first-year average above the plaintiff's. Since no more than 150 applicants
were to be admitted, the admission of less qualified resulted in a denial of places to
those otherwise qualified. The plaintiff and others in this group, have not in my
opinion been accorded the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment." De Funis v. Odegaard, Civil No. 741727 (Super. Ct. of King County,
Wash., filed Sept. 22, 1971), cited in What's New in the Law, 57 A.B.A.J. 1230,
1233 (1971).
112. See text accompanying notes 76-78 supra.
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provided that the blacks be selected from the list of "qualified" ap-
prentice applicants; however, no distinction was drawn in the term
qualified. It is probable that in order to secure the needed number
of blacks to meet the statistical goal, a number of better qualified
whites will be denied at least temporarily an apprenticeship opportu-
nity. The blacks near the top of the list would possess comparable
qualifications to their white counterparts. However, further down the
list the results of an educationally disadvantaged background will begin
to become apparent, and if the largest group of black applicants is
well down on the list, the union may find it necessary to skip over
higher qualified whites in order to fill the thirty percent level es-
tablished by the court. This brief exposition illustrates the possibility
that the court may have unwittingly, or deliberately, injected a reverse
racial consideration into the hiring process, something that Title VII
was intended to eliminate. In order to correct one evil, the court
has created another.
Another potentially detrimental side effect of the court's action
is the possible inducement of the employer or union to establish its
own "silent" performance goals in order to minimize the risk of be-
coming the object of an investigation or to avoid being required to
rebut an inference of discrimination in court. The unions may admit
a number of blacks into the apprenticeship programs on the basis of
their color, regardless of their particular skill or aptitude, in order to
protect themselves from possible investigation by the attorney general's
office. Such subtle action would further obviate the stated purposes-
to eliminate racial consideration from the employment process.
The failure of the Ninth Circuit in Local 86 to provide any in-
dication as to the criteria which were utilized in arriving at the thirty
percent performance goals placed upon the apprenticeship committees
further adds to the uncertainty surrounding this decision, and leaves
subsequent courts to their own imagination in devising such perform-
ance goals.
In contrast, the "minority manpower utilization goals" developed
in the Philadelphia Plan,113 and which have been approved by the at-
113. The revised Philadelphia Plan as adopted by the Nixon administration is a
significant attempt to pressure construction trade unions and contractors into accept-
ing larger percentages of minority workers by threatening the loss of lucrative govern-
ment contracts for noncompliance. Where the estimated total cost of the construction
project exceeds $500,000, each bidder must, in an affirmative action plan submitted
with his bid, set specific goals of "minority manpower utilization" which he or his
subcontractor will attempt to meet in performing the contract. These "goals"
apply to the sheetmetal, electrical, elevator construction, plumbers and pipefitters, and
ironworking trades which have less than two percent union minority group participa-
tion in the Philadelphia area. The goals set by the bidder must be at least as high as
those set out in the order implementing the plan. The goals vary for each trade and
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torney general"14 were carefully devised. The foundation for these
goals was based on several specific factors including the disparity in
the number of minority workers between the affected crafts and other
skilled construction trades; the availability of minority members for
employment; the need for, and availability of, training for minority
persons at various skill levels; the attrition rate of the current work
force; and the projected growth rate of each craft. The implementa-
tion of the Philadelphia Plan had been surrounded by a great deal of
controversy and at one time, the comptroller general" 5 had determined
that the plan violated Title VII's prohibition on the granting of racial
preferences. Even though the plan has now been approved by the
attorney general, the fact that it had been found violative of Title VII
in spite of the detailed justification for the various minority employ-
ment goals, indicating that the decision in Local 86 may be subject
to criticism. The Ninth Circuit failed to enumerate any criteria upon
which it based the thirty percent level established as a performance
goal. Though the plan was later approved by the attorney general
as not violating Title VII, there are many distinctions between the plan
requirements and the goals set forth in the court's decree in Local 86.
The Philadelphia Plan is in a sense voluntary, because it applies only
to contractors seeking federal construction contracts; the order issued
in Local 86 is mandatory. Also, the guidelines or goals established
under the plan are relaxed if a "good faith effort" by the contractor
fails to recruit the desired number of qualified workers. In Local 86
the unions have no choice but to comply with the arbitrary perform-
ance goals or be held in contempt. The attorney general's approval
of the plan was centered around the voluntariness of the guidelines,
in that they affected only contractors who bid successfully on a govern-
ment contract. Even though there are significant distinctions between
the Philadelphia Plan and the circumstances of Local 86, the court
might have benefited by utilizing criteria similar to those in the plan
in establishing the performance goals for the union. Had this been
range from four to five percent in the first year to as high as twenty-two to twenty-six
percent in the fourth year. See 42 Op. Arr'y GEN. No. 37 (1969); The Philadelphia
Plan: Equal Employment Opportunity in the Construction Trades, 6 CoLUM. J.L &
Soc. PROB. 187 (1970); Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employment Under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 32U. CHI. L. Rnv. 430 (1965).
114. "It is not correct to say that Title VII prohibits employers from making
race or national origin a factor for consideration at any stage in the process of ob-
taining employees. The legal definition of discrimination is an evolving one, but it is
now well recognized in judicial opinions that the obligation of nondiscrimination,
whether imposed by statute or by the Constitution, does not require and, in some cir-
cumstances, may not permit obliviousness or indifference to the racial consequences
of alternative courses of action which involve the application of outwardly neutral
criteria." 42 Op. Arr'y GEN. No. 37, at 7 (1969).
115. Id. at 4.
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done, much of the conjecture concerning the "minimum levels of
participation" enunciated by the court could have been eliminated.
In summary, the entire opinion in Local 86 creates more doubt
and confusion as to the scope of Title VII than it solves. The court's
order provides that the blacks necessary to fulfill the thirty percent
level are to be selected from the list of qualified apprentice applicants;
yet, the court does not indicate the consequences should the list not
contain sufficient blacks to meet this requirement. Further, the court
gives no hint as to how long the union will be subject to these per-
formance goals. That is, will the union be presumed to be discrimi-
nating until the black union membership reaches the thirty percent level,
or just until the apprenticeship programs are training a "sufficient"
number of blacks.
Conclusion
The result ordered by the Ninth Circuit in Local 86 significantly
expanded the available kinds of affirmative relief under Title VII, and
despite the court's disclaimer, such relief appears to accord preferential
treatment to blacks, in violation of section 703(j) of the act. While,
under proper circumstances, it may be entirely proper to require the
unions to take the initiative in insuring that the present or past dis-
criminatory practices do not impede equal employment opportunities,
such requirements should be remedial in concept. 116 The heartbeat
of such a concept should be a policy of developing programs which
provide specific steps guaranteeing equal employment opportunities
keyed to the specific problems and needs of those who have been
discriminated against. When such discrimination is noted, goals and
timetables should be developed for the prompt achievement of full and
equal employment opportunities. 117  Care should be exercised in the
development of such goals, however, to insure that they do not involve
racial preferences, which would violate section 7030) of the act. In-
stead the goal should be to provide employment opportunities solely
on the basis of qualifications without regard to race. In Local 86
the Ninth Circuit appears to have injected a reverse racial consideration
into the hiring process by virtue of the thirty percent minority participa-
tion requirements. Even though the imposition of arbitrary percentage
requirements have the advantage of ease of application, such relief
tends to oversimplify the problem and will ultimately require further
judicial action when the variables come into play. In formulating
relief under Title VII, courts should be mindful of all the interests in-
116. Jones, The Bugaboo of Employment Quotas, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 341, 366
(1970).
117. Contractors Ass'n v. Schultz, 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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volved and should avoid over reaction which may be as violative of
Title VII as the alleged discriminatory practices sought to be corrected.
Only through thoughtful formulation of meaningful guidelines, based
on thorough evidence, will the courts fulfill the basic purposes of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act to achieve equal employment opportunities
in America.
John B. Weldon, Jr.*
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